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Abstract. This study examines the way in which Tokyo has exploited the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a symbolic means of inducing post-war 
Japanese collective identity. To consider an effort on Tokyo’s part to integrate A-bomb 
memories into the country’s victim consciousness rather than to overcome the past, the 
study compares the A-bombed cities written with different Japanese forms, the peace 
parks, and the peace memorials. It also analyses the news coverage by two national 
daily papers on the A-bomb memorial days. By doing so, the study shows how the 
nation has been guided in its memory by the government. 
Different ways of recognising a historical fact, even if an event actually happened 
at a certain time and place, exist at various global, national and local levels. As it 
is not a factual object, history changes in the continuing process of storytelling. 
As Frederic C. Bartlett points out, a given fact is the result of ‘re-membering’ the 
past from a present position of ‘now, here’ (Bartlett 1932). A national holiday or 
public commemoration shapes our direct and indirect experiences through historical 
environments like public monuments, museums, and school textbooks. It socially 
constructs the collectivity of national, local or personal memory (Halbwachs 1992). 
In such a process of remembering, a historical site is reinvented to foster a new 
collective identity. In the recent trend towards globalisation, different interpretations 
or understandings of the past at the personal, regional and social level have brought 
collective memory to centre stage. 
This study examines the way in which the Tokyo government has exploited the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a symbolic means of inducing post-war 
Japanese collective identity (Burke 1969b, 43). To consider an effort on Tokyo’s part 
to integrate A-bomb memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the country’s victim 
consciousness rather than to overcome the past, the study will begin by comparing 
the Japanese written forms, peace parks, and peace memorials. Comparisons of the 
inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki living with the atomic bomb will be followed 
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by an examination of what is to be remembered, how it is to be remembered, and why 
it should be remembered. The special law for planning of the A-bombed cities passed 
in 1947 turned Hiroshima into Heiwakinen Toshi (Peace and Memorial City) and 
Nagasaki into Kokusaibunka Toshi (International and Cultural City). The study will 
end by analysing the news coverage in two national daily papers, the Asahi Shimbun 
and Yomiuri Shimbun, on the A-bomb memorial days and raise the question of who is 
supposed to be the actor in remembering ‘Hiroshima’ and ‘Nagasaki’. 
Site of A-bomb memory
An act of written or spoken language embodies what is to be remembered within 
the social structure of a given culture and how it is to be remembered. What follows 
explores how the A-bombed cities have been seen as the ‘site of memory’ by which 
Japan throughout the Cold War era can be a war victim and play down its past 
aggression (Nora 1989). First, I will focus on the different ways of writing Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki with Japanese symbols. I will then describe how Tokyo has incorporated 
the A-bomb memories of the cities into a Japanese distinctiveness, while the cities 
have tried to preserve, through ritual their own, experience with the nuclear attack 
against ‘humankind’. 
Print language
In Japanese written forms, there are three writing systems to represent information 
visually: Chinese characters called kanji, Japanese characters called hiragana, and 
its variant called katakana, which is used specifically for foreign loanwords. From 
their origins, pictures have been a consistent way to represent particular images 
and developed into picture-writing, pictographs. In time, this form became part of 
a system of idea-writing, an ideogram. The distinction between pictographs and 
ideograms derives from a difference in the relationship between the symbol and what 
it represents. The more concrete, picture-like symbols are pictograms, and the more 
abstract, conceptual symbols are ideograms. In addition, many Chinese characters 
are used to show the meaning of words, while Japanese characters are chosen for 
describing the sounds of spoken words. How have Hiroshima and Nagasaki been 
remembered with these different Japanese forms of writing? The A-bombed cities, 
when they are depicted with kanji, hiragana and katakana, seem to present different 
memories. 
The two different ways of writing Hiroshima with Chinese characters show 
the historical discontinuity between the A-bombed military city and the present 
representative of world peace. Hiroshima written with the archaic Chinese characters 
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廣島 stands for its pre-war development as a prosperous city. It calls to mind the 
rise of Japanese military expansionism and imperial colonialism. The city once was 
briefly the imperial Japanese capital, having the Meiji Emperor as its commander-in-
chief during the 1894 Sino-Japanese War. As a gunto (military capital), Hiroshima 
in the early 20th century sent armed forces to the Asian continent and benefited from 
many of the most important military bases and harbours. Thus it became the first 
target of a nuclear bomb. On the contrary, Hiroshima written with the modern-day 
Chinese characters 広島, which is now most commonly used in Japanese, erases 
such negative implications. The new version merely marks the city as one of the 
government ordinance–designed cities in post-war Japan. 
The syllabic expression with the Japanese characters ひろしま is increasingly 
used in the visual rhetoric of tourist posters and municipal events these days. The 
Japanese characters, rounded and softly curved, bring about new nostalgic images of 
furusato (hometown) (see Robertson 1991, 19–22). As this hiragana syllabary is the 
first form of writing that native speakers of Japanese acquire, this use calls up images 
of furusato and makes advertising slogans and tourist appeals open to a lost past that 
many Japanese can share (see Ivy 1995, 29–65). 
In contrast to such nostalgic implications of discovering another Japan, Hiroshima 
written with the phonographic symbols ヒロシマ, which are mainly used for 
transliterating foreign terms, can be often used in peace and antinuclear discourses. 
While symbolising Japan’s recovery from the defeat in the war in a national context, 
in a global context it characterises post-nuclear Hiroshima for the peace and 
antinuclear movements. For instance, the expression reminds readers of the well-
known English slogan ‘No More Hiroshimas’ as well as the historic moment of the 
first use of a nuclear bomb against human beings. Another example is an important 
representative of A-bomb literature, Natsu no Hana (Summer Flowers). By inserting 
a poem and katakana into this documentary memoir of Hiroshima, the author, Hara 
Tamiki, tries his best to express a sense of urgency and something extraordinary. With 
such visual rhetoric, Hiroshima written with symbols for foreign loan words reflects 
the fundamental struggles between remembering and forgetting the site of nuclear 
atrocities. Such mixed feelings deeply seated in the minds of A-bomb–bereaved 
families and A-bombed survivors tend to be overlooked in highly politicised peace 
movements. 
In the case of Nagasaki, the written expression with Chinese characters, 長崎, 
represents the historical development of the city as a place for international trade. 
Under the obligatory educational system, the post-war Japanese school textbook of 
Nihonshi (Japanese national history) explains that a large percentage of the Nagasaki 
population used to be Christian under the control of Catholic daimyoo (feudal warlords) 
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from the 1580s until the year 1614 when Catholicism was officially banned and all 
missionaries were ordered to leave. After the enforcement of this expulsion order by 
the Tokugawa regime, Nagasaki became one of the few windows open to contact with 
the Western world under its closed-door policy from 1633 to 1853. On the one hand, 
the city is famous for trade with the Portuguese, Dutch and British in the 16th century. 
On the other hand, it is infamous for its brutal prosecution of Catholics and later for its 
major imperial Japanese Navy base. From 1867 to 1889, after the Meiji Restoration, 
the growth of Nagasaki was based on the prosperity of warship building, and the city 
ended up being selected as the second target of a nuclear bomb. Overall, the expression 
長崎 stands for both its international influence and its atomic destruction. 
With international overtones, the phonetic expression ナガサキ is associated with 
the notion ‘Atomic Wasteland’, the English slogan ‘Peace Begins in Nagasaki’, or 
the Japanese slogan ‘Nagasaki o Saigo no Hibakuchi ni’ (Let Nagasaki Be the Last 
A-bombed City). The phonetic expression replaces the hidden memory of wartime 
wrongdoings with the idealism of common humanity that post-nuclear Nagasaki 
has called for. Along with its focus on history, Nagasaki simply expressed with the 
Japanese syllabic characters ながさき calls to mind the same nostalgic implications 
as Hiroshima. The expression encourages the nostalgic notion of child-like innocence, 
and at the same time transforms the city’s ‘ordeal’ into its ‘redemption,’ as Doctor 
Nagai Takashi referred to the atomic bomb in his books such as Nagasaki no Kane (the 
Bell of Nagasaki) (see also Nagasaki City 1996). 
These different types of writing the names of the A-bombed cities are different ways 
for the cities to represent themselves in the world or to form their local, national and 
global identities. For the Tokyo government, by contrast, they are a symbolic means 
of integrating different expressions, values, beliefs, attitudes and social identities into 
sharing grounds of collective identity. In the national, local and personal realm of 
memory, how have authorities made use of the implications of the ways of writing 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki? 
To restore national pride, Tokyo has used the different symbols of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki for a softer image and less reference to Japan’s war guilt. In the national 
news coverage, which I will provide examples of later, Hiroshima is rarely written 
with the archaic Chinese, but with the modern-day Chinese to whitewash the city’s 
militaristic past. In news accounts of peace ceremonies, the print media have described 
the A-bombed cities as equivalent with other Japanese cities by using the common 
expressions 広島 and 長崎. Yet the media sometimes adopt the expressions with the 
phonetic symbols ヒロシマ, and ナガサキ on occasion, for headlines to emphasise 
the promotion of peace movements. Especially since the early 1980s, editorial 
coverage has made frequent use of Hiroshima written with the phonetic symbols to 
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remind national readers of the country’s feeling against nuclear weapons. The Tokyo 
government has fostered Japan’s victim consciousness in order to deny any role as the 
war aggressor, by emphasising the tragic implications of the A-bombed cities. 
In addition to the different ways of writing Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese, 
spelling the names in English has another social influence and power for the Japanese. 
The English spelling emphasises the cities as representatives of peace and not as 
claimants of crimes against humanity. In occupied Japan, the US view of history 
prevailed: the use of the atomic bomb was not a crime against humanity, but God’s 
plan to bring peace to the world. During the Cold War, the United States moved up as 
a global power and replaced Britain as the number one country without a war between 
the two nations. In such a global context, Japan has not opposed this view since there 
are economic benefits for Japan to work within this understanding. Instead, Tokyo 
has integrated the A-bomb memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the national 
feeling against nuclear weapons, which is well known as Japan’s ‘nuclear allergy’, 
into a shared sense of being a heiwaaikoo (peace-loving) nation. As Japan grows 
in economic strength and national pride, the collective memory of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as symbols of peace, in short, becomes general and easy for all to accept. 
Peace ceremony
To develop Japan’s cultural identity, the central government focuses on the 
distinctiveness of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since the 1970s, the government has 
disseminated the official story of the ‘only A-bombed nation’. In addition, the national 
media have framed the cities’ memorial ceremonies in a way similar to state ritual. 
The Shintoist framework turns them into the only nation that witnessed the dawn of 
the so-called atomic age. By marking a distinct before and after, the government has 
distinguished the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from events elsewhere. 
Hiroshima has commemorated 8:15 on the morning of 6 August and Nagasaki 
City, 11:02 on the morning of 9 August as a ‘destined moment’. The A-bombed cities 
have held the so-called ‘peace memorial ceremony’ every 6 August since 1947 and 
every 9 August since 1948. The year 1950, when the Korean War broke out, was 
the only year that both cities had to cancel each ceremony for the fear of causing 
political turmoil. In official notices, Hiroshima basically uses the word with Chinese 
characters, 記念, whereas Nagasaki continuously uses 祈念. As homophones, both 
words are pronounced kinen in Japanese. Yet the words contain the different meanings, 
‘to memorialise’ and ‘to commemorate’ peace, respectively. Hiroshima called its first 
memorial ceremony Heiwasai (Peace Festival). In 1968 the city changed it into the more 
official sounding Genbaku Shibotsusha Ireishiki narabini Heiwakinenshiki (Ceremony 
Memorialising the A-bomb Dead and Commemorating Peace). In 1975, Hiroshima 
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officially announced the use of the abbreviation 平和記念式典 (heiwakinenshikiten: 
ceremony to memorialise peace) (Ubuki 1992, i, 9–26). By contrast, Nagasaki first 
avoided using expressions like ‘A-bomb’ and ‘peace’ in official discourse. Under the 
US-centred Allied occupation, the city named the first ceremony Bunkasai (Cultural 
Festival). This shows part of the Japanese self-censorship during the occupation era 
(1945–52). Later, Nagasaki officially titled the peace ceremony Nagasaki Genbaku 
Giseisha Heiwakinenshikiten (Ceremony Commemorating Nagasaki A-bomb Victims 
and Peace). Its abbreviation is written 平和祈念式 (Heiwakinenshiki, ceremony to 
commemorate peace). 
The difference of a single Chinese letter, 記 and 祈, is not a mere difference of visual 
impressions, because each ideogram stands for its own representation. According 
to the Japanese Koojien dictionary, which has a standing equivalent to the English 
Oxford English Dictionary or Merriam Webster Dictionary, the term 記念, which used 
to be written by 紀念, consists of the verb form 記す (shirusu, to memorialise) and 
means to preserve something or someone in living memory. It also suggests a future-
oriented action based on a past event. On the other hand, the term 祈念 consists of the 
verb form 祈る (inoru, to commemorate), and means to pray to God for someone or 
something. This implies one’s dependence on God or one’s expectation that something 
will come true under divine providence. Regardless of the different meanings of 記念 
and 祈念, Tokyo has integrated both Hiroshima and Nagasaki into the national sites 
of the atomic bombing in memory/commemoration of the war’s end. 
For the official title of the peace memorial ceremony, Hiroshima has used the 
Genbaku Shibotsusha (A-bomb dead) and Nagasaki the Genbaku Giseisha (A-bomb 
victims) as a term of address for those who were killed by the atomic explosion. 
Contrary to these municipal governments, the national government has used the 
term senbotsusha (war dead) in the nationwide Zenkoku Senbotsusha Tsuitooshiki 
(Memorial Service for the Japanese War Dead) in memory of the noon on 15 August 
1945 when the recorded Shuusen no Mikotonori (Rescript of the War’s End) read 
by the Emperor Showa was broadcast to the Imperial Japanese population. The 
expression ‘war dead’ used from the first state-sponsored ritual in 1963 means those 
who died on the battlefield, including those who died of war injuries as well as war 
diseases. It also implies that they would be enshrined as eirei (heroic martyrs) in the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The Shintoist framework that transforms a war death into a heroic 
sacrifice has sustained the division between those who died for the country and those 
who were killed in name of the country. In post-war Japanese society, the latter has 
been further divided into those killed by atomic bombs, those killed by air raids, and 
those abandoned in the former Japanese colonial territories (Yamamoto 2005, 200–1; 
Ueno 2002, 6). 
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Under the US-centred tutelage, self-censorship and Allied censorship of A-bomb 
coverage prevented raising national consciousness of what had happened to 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Braw 1991). It was in the 1970s that Tokyo for the first 
time took action to incorporate the A-bomb memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
into the ‘starting point’ of post-war Japan’s peace and prosperity, making a gesture 
of political consideration for the A-bombed survivors. By doing so, the Tokyo 
government aimed to underscore the country’s total devastation in the aftermath 
of the war. This encouraged the vanquished to overlook its military expansionism 
and imperial colonialism. In international politics, however, this discouraged Tokyo 
from criticising the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity and even 
from taking the lead in nuclear disarmament. In 1985, the Editing Committee of the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki City A-bomb Disaster published a book titled Genbaku 
Saigai (A-bomb Disaster). This title represents the official view of the atomic 
bombing as if it were a natural disaster like an earthquake and flood. At the local 
level, the word ‘victim’ in the term ‘A-bombed victims’ used by Nagasaki reflects this 
official interpretation: there were no agents responsible for the A-bomb deaths. While 
the word higaisha (sufferer) has an antonymous expression, kagaisha (offenders or 
wrongdoers), giseisha (victims) has no antonym. 
Overall, the Tokyo government continues to make symbolic use of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki as the national memory of unforgettable tragedies, which allows Japan to 
deny charges of war crimes. 
Ground Zero1
Taking advantage of A-bomb memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo sought 
to invent post-war Japan as an imagined community of ‘war victims/sacrifice’ 
(Anderson 1991). For that purpose, the atomic bomb sites have played an important 
role in retaining a few A-bomb ruins and providing a chance to see ‘living history’. 
Hiroshima preserves Ground Zero as one unit, named Hiroshima Heiwa Kinen Kooen 
(Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park). By contrast, Nagasaki divides Ground Zero into 
the Genbaku Rakkacyuushinchi Kooen (A-bomb Hypocentre Park) in 記念 (kinen, 
memory) of the atomic bombing and the Nagasaki Heiwa Kooen (Nagasaki Peace 
Park) in 祈念 (kinen, commemoration) of the A-bombed victims. Whereas the former 
park provides a place to mark the bombing that brought us peace, the latter offers a 
place to hold the peace ceremony. Moreover, the Hiroshima peace park is famous for 
1  I here briefly note how events surrounding the 11 September 2001 attacks became intersected 
with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by popular appropriation of the term ‘ground 
zero’ to designate the site—the rubble of the World Trade Center—along with images of ash-cov-
ered, disoriented New Yorkers. 
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the officially named Hiroshima Heiwa Toshi Kinen Hi, the so-called Genbaku Ireihi 
(A-bomb Cenotaph) (Hiroshima City Peace Commemorative Monument), designed 
by architect Tange Kenzo. The Nagasaki peace park is well known by the Heiwa 
Kinen Zoo (Peace Memorial Statue) sculptured by Kitamura Seibou. Each memorial 
is supposed to reflect on the atomic blast. Furthermore, Hiroshima has held its 
peace ceremony in front of the cenotaph since its completion on 6 August 1952. 
Nagasaki has usually held its peace ceremony in front of the peace statue since its 
completion on 9 August 1955. In media coverage, the central government has made 
the memorials symbolic of the nuclear tragedies conducive to the official story of the 
‘only A-bombed nation’. While enhancing ground zeros as national sites of memory, 
the government has transformed those who were killed by the fission bomb into those 
who died for their country so as to confirm post-war Japanese collective identity. 
The A-bomb Cenotaph and the Peace Memorial Statue also provide a teleological 
meaning for A-bombed deaths. The cenotaph has been part of reiterating a sanctioned 
time and place for Shinto to unite, as well as divide, war deaths. In his construction 
plan for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, Tange modelled the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Museum on the Ise Shrine and the A-bomb cenotaph on the arch-shaped 
stone tomb of the Kofun Period (from the 3rd to the 6th century). He placed those two 
memorial constructions symmetrically on each side of the main structure in line with 
the Genbaku Dome (A-bomb Dome) designed by an architect from Czechoslovakia, 
Jan Letzel. Now, visitors can see only the steel skeleton and some old brick walls 
of the building that escaped collapse from the bomb. As a symbolic landmark of 
Hiroshima, the ruin has become its most attractive tourist attraction. The central axis 
runs in a straight line from the dome through the ‘Peace Pond’ constructed in 1957 
and the ‘Eternal Flame of Peace’ constructed in 1964 to the peace museum. Based on 
this straight line as the ‘worshipping line’ of the peace park, a Shintoist ‘sanction’ like 
the Yasukuni Shrine emerges: the A-bomb Dome turns out to be the honden (main 
building) and the A-bomb Cenotaph the haiden (entrance building) in the Naikuu 
(Inner Shrine), while the Peace Memorial Museum becomes the ‘main building’ in the 
Gekuu (Outer Shrine) (Inoue 1995; Iijima 1996; Yoneyama 1999). 
The architecture designed to mark the world’s first use of a nuclear bomb is similar 
to the Daitooa Kensetsu Kinen Zooei Keikaku (Commemorative Building Project for 
the Construction of Greater East Asia) proposed by Tange in 1942. This implicit 
structural continuity between the two memorial plans often fails to be recognised 
because of the focus of attention on the first nuclear attack. The vision restoring a 
Shintoist memorial zone in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park not only turns the 
A-bombed dead into martyrs in a state-sanctioned time and place but also promotes 
heroic sacrifice for the country as a norm for the nation of Japan. In these regards, the 
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peace ceremony gives rise to the same Shintoist memorial zone as the state ritual that 
continues to ensure Great Imperial Japan’s honour and glory. 
The peace statue has been also part of creating a Shintoist memorial zone. Whereas 
Ground Zero in Hiroshima is surrounded by war ruins, monuments, and memorials 
(Sturken 1991, 118), that in Nagasaki is divided into the hypocentre of the atomic blast 
and the memorial park for world peace. The Bakushinchi Kooen memorial (Park of 
the Atomic Blast Hypocentre) preserves the black-stoned triangular prism engraved 
with the phrase Nagasaki Genbaku Jyunnansha no Rei (Souls of Those Killed by the 
Atomic Bomb in Nagasaki) and the relocated A-bombed walls from the Urakami 
Catholic Church. On the hill that spreads to its north, the Heiwa Kooen (Peace Park) 
contains monuments like the Heiwa no Izumi (Fountain of Peace) and the Heiwa no 
Kane (Bell of Nagasaki) around the peace statue. The park seems to get rid of the 
dark atomic bomb image. Whenever Nagasaki holds the peace ceremony in the peace 
park on 9 August, the white wooden pillar or triangular pyramid is placed just in front 
of the statue. On its face is written in Japanese calligraphy Genbaku Giseisha no Rei 
(Souls of the A-bombed Victims) parallel to the Japanese calligraphy Senbotsusha no 
Rei (Souls of the War Dead) written on the white pillar. In this way, those killed by the 
bomb have been placed into a sanctioned time and place for hero worship. 
Examining how the central government has made rhetorical use of print languages, 
peace ceremonies, and ground zeros reveals its effort to obliterate from national 
history Japan’s past military rule, national mobilisation, and emperor worship. 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki  
in the national coverage
Around every 6 and 9 August, most Japanese newspapers continue to cover the 
A-bombed cities. The front page of their evening edition or following morning edition 
also highlights the peace ceremony on each memorial day. Throughout August, the 
highlight of media coverage is the issue of why the war broke out, what the war aimed 
for, or how Japan recovered from the lost war. In the photo coverage, the A-bomb 
Cenotaph, the A-bomb Dome, and/or the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum often 
has the peace park in the background, and the white triangular pyramid with the 
Japanese calligraphy ‘Souls of the A-bombed Victims’ has the Peace Memorial Statue 
in the background, or a few anonymous female Christians wearing veils praying for 
peace in the Urakami Christian Church. In these regards, Japanese journalism plays 
the part of a national network that sanctions a ‘memorial time and place’, reaches 
a national consensus on the ‘only A-bombed nation’, and confirms an imagined 
community of post-war Japan. 
20 H I R O K O  O K U D A
The first section of what follows will discuss how the two national newspapers 
Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun have described Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their 
editorials and front pages. The second section will examine how these newspapers 
have shaped A-bomb memories into the collective memory of post-war Japan through 
visual rhetoric. How have the Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bomb memorial days been 
framed in the national news coverage since 1945? 
Editorials
The editorials of both the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun have discussed 
Hiroshima in their morning editions on the A-bomb Memorial Day. The first editorial 
of the Asahi Shimbun, ‘A “Living Shadow” Remains in Hiroshima’, is the only one 
in which Hiroshima is written with the old-style Chinese characters, 廣島. From 
1949 to 2008, the Asahi Shimbun issued 53 editorial articles. The editorial coverage 
is characterised by supporting the renunciation of the atomic and hydrogen bomb in 
the 1950s, voicing concern about the split in the movements against nuclear weapons 
in the 1960s, demanding nuclear disarmament in the 1970s, promoting antinuclear 
movements in the 1980s, calling for antinuclear principles in the 1990s, and reflecting 
the starting point of Hiroshima at the beginning of the new century. It was 1972 when 
Hiroshima with katakana ヒロシマ appeared for the first time in the editorial text. 
This signalled a shift from peace and an antinuclear tone to a self-reflective discourse, 
particularly in the 1991 editorial ‘Time to Say Hiroshima’. This editorial refers to 
the Hiroshima Peace Declaration that for the first time mentions imperial Japanese 
aggression. The editorial notes that now Japan is in the ‘double bind of being a victim 
and an aggressor’ in the war. 
Over fifty-eight years, the Yomiuri Shimbun has carried thirty-eight editorial 
articles since the 6 August 1950 ‘Sunday Reading: Fifth Anniversary of the Atomic 
Bombing’ by Tsuji Jirou. The editorial trend is towards praying for peace in the 
1950s and 1960s, preserving A-bomb memories in the 1970s, appealing for nuclear 
disarmament in the 1980s and 1990s, and calling for a new framework for collective 
security at the beginning of the 21st century. It was five years earlier than the Asahi 
Shimbun that the phonetic written expression Hiroshima appeared in its editorial 
coverage, the 1967 editorial titled ‘On the A-bomb Memorial Day: Hiroshima is One’. 
Moreover, the 1990 editorial ‘Reflecting in Another “A-bomb Summer”’ refers to the 
Nagasaki Peace Declaration demanding that the national government must apologise 
to the A-bomb survivors living in North and South Korea. In spite of its nationalistic 
tendency, the Yomiuri editorial takes a liberal position that supports human rights and 
moral judgment from a contemporary perspective. 
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In contrast to the Hiroshima A-bomb Memorial Day, the editorials of the Asahi 
Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun have seldom discussed the Nagasaki A-bomb 
Memorial Day on 9 August.2 In front-page coverage, however, both newspapers have 
placed news stories about the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony as often as those about the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony. The Asahi Shimbun has reported thirty-eight 
accounts of the peace ceremony since the article ‘Silent Anger against Atomic and 
Hydrogen Bomb: After 12 Years, “Peace Ceremony” Held in Nagasaki Today’ in the 
9 August 1957 evening edition. Forty-two front-page news reports on the ceremony 
have been in the Yomiuri Shimbun since the article ‘Twentieth Anniversary of the 
Atomic Bombing in Nagasaki: Pledge to Peace in Front of the Souls of the A-bombed 
Victims’ in the 9 August 1965 evening edition. Overall, both national newspapers have 
integrated the editorial comments on Hiroshima and Nagasaki into their editorials of 
August 6, and then connected those A-bomb memorial days to the national Shuusen 
Kinenbi (Memorial Day for the War’s End) on August 15. 
The news coverage of the peace ceremonies, however, displays conflict between 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, both the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun 
started to carry news stories about Hiroshima on their front pages ten years earlier 
than they did about Nagasaki. Since the 7 August 1947 morning edition in which 
the first report ‘Mourning and Praying for Peace: “Peace Festival” in the City of 
Hiroshima Yesterday Morning’ appeared, the Asahi Shimbun has given an account of 
Hiroshima every year except 1948, 1950, 1952, 1953, 1956 and 1958. Since 1955, the 
Yomiuri Shimbun has focused on Hiroshima every year except 1956, 1958 and 1967. 
Hence Hiroshima has become more famous for showing the dangers of nuclear war 
than Nagasaki. 
Second, the time when the news stories about the people of Hiroshima living 
with the consequences of the atomic bomb expanded into other sections was earlier 
and the amount was larger than those about Nagasaki. The Asahi Shimbun began to 
develop its news coverage of Hiroshima in the 6 August 1963 evening edition, and 
the Yomiuri Shimbun started in the 6 August 1965 evening edition. In addition, the 
headlines for the Hiroshima peace ceremony show the city’s active participation in 
foreign affairs, while those for Nagasaki are most often the same Nagasaki Genbakuki 
(Nagasaki A-bomb Memorial Day). About half of the headlines about Hiroshima 
include the ending form of Japanese verbs like uttau or uttaeru (to appeal), chikau (to 
2  The Asahi Shimbun carried two editorials ‘In Deference to the Demilitarized Zone’ in 1966 
and ‘Memorials in the Summer of 2001: Distance Between the Heiwa no Ishiji (the Cornerstone of 
Peace in Okinawa) and Yasukuni Shrine’ in 2001. Four editorials—‘About the Cultural Nation-state’ 
in 1946, ‘One Year Since the Partial Test Ban Treaty and Japanese Diplomacy’ in 1964, ‘Viewpoint 
Crucial to Peace and Disarmament’ in 1985, and ‘Japan’s Role in the Rise of a New Nuclear Anxiety’ 
in 1998—appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun.
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pledge), inoru (to pray), and negau (to hope), or the imperative form like mezase (to 
aim at), musube (to connect), and sukue (to save). Most of them are also quotations 
from the peace declaration of that year. This has left an impression that Hiroshima is 
more symbolic of a nuclear-free world than Nagasaki. 
Last, the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun started to carry photo reports 
about the Hiroshima peace ceremony almost ten years earlier than that about 
Nagasaki. In the 7 August 1949 morning edition of the Asahi Shimbun, the photo 
‘Citizens of Hiroshima Gather around the Peace Tower, Reporting from Hiroshima’ 
appeared in the right top corner. The first photo caption of the Yomiuri Shimbun was 
‘Site of the Tenth Anniversary of the Atomic Bombing, from Yomiuri 101 Plane 
(report from Hiroshima)’ in 9 August 1955. In contrast, the first photo coverage about 
the Nagasaki peace ceremony was, ‘Peace Ceremony in the Nagasaki Peace Park, 
Taken from the Plane Asakaze’ in the evening edition of the Asahi Shimbun on 9 
August 1957 and ‘People Paying a Visit to the Memorial for the A-bombed Victims, 
Doves Soaring’ in the evening edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun on 9 August 1965. In 
general, Hiroshima has been selected more than Nagasaki to be part of justifying the 
country’s cultural amnesia. 
In Japanese newspapers, while Nagasaki has been seen as a symbol of peace, 
Hiroshima has been symbolic of resurrection because it reminds the country of the 
A-bomb Dome. As a site of A-bomb memory, the dome stands for the scourge of war 
as well as the rise from the ruins of war. In fact, the Tokyo government has made the 
best of that image to make a sharp contrast between before and after the birth of the 
atomic bomb. In doing so, the government has diminished the possibilities of agents, 
and even their responsibility for what occurred. Moreover, Hiroshima was the first 
target of the nuclear bomb against human beings. Also, its geographical factors caused 
a larger range of destruction, a larger number of casualties, and greater aftereffects 
than in Nagasaki. As the print coverage has consistently focused on Hiroshima rather 
than Nagasaki, the association between Hiroshima and the national feeling against 
nuclear weapons has become a familiar rhetorical pattern in post-war Japan. 
Photo coverage
The notion of ‘framing effects’ of news coverage proposed by communication 
scholar Shanto Iyengar shows a shift from the thematic (issue-oriented) to the 
episodic (event-oriented) news frame in the photo coverage of the Hiroshima Peace 
Memorial Ceremony.3 Both the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun focused 
3  According to Iyengar, most political news formats take either an episodic or a thematic frame. 
While the episodic form focuses on specific events or particular cases, the thematic form places 
general issues in broad contexts (1991, 11–6).
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on the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the A-bomb Cenotaph, or the A-bomb 
Dome as a symbol of the post-nuclear world in the photographs until the 1990s. The 
only exception is the photo ‘Prime Minister Sato Bowing his Head in Front of the 
A-bomb Cenotaph’ on the front page of the 6 August 1971 evening edition of the 
Asahi Shimbun. Sato Eisaku, later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, was the first serving 
head of state to participate in the peace ceremony. Since then, the Tokyo government 
has made the best of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the premise of the ‘only A-bombed 
nation’ official discourse. 
The thematic frame of the photo coverage highlights the city’s complete atomic 
destruction as evidence for the starting point of post-war Japan. Of forty-eight 
photographs on the front page of the Asahi Shimbun, the cenotaph can be been found 
in thirty-eight, the dome in thirty-one, and the museum in three. Of fifty photographs 
in the Yomiuri Shimbun, the cenotaph can be found in forty-seven, the dome in thirty-
six, and the museum in ten. Both newspapers have the same ranking of subjects. In 
addition, their photo coverage often includes the stone coffin in the cenotaph together 
with the dome. This issue-oriented frame brings about contrastive images between 
a building quite innovative for its day and what is reduced to rubble by a single 
bomb. Through such a visual impact, the steel skeleton of the dome stresses victim 
consciousness and minimises self-reflection about Japanese involvement in setting 
the course of history. 
The photographs including the cenotaph with the dome imply another contrast 
of the city’s past and present. The atomic bomb transformed a once logistical base 
for military transport into a Mecca of peace pilgrimages from all over the world. 
The building, now called ‘A-bomb Dome’, opened as the Hiroshimaken Bussan 
Chinretsukan (Hiroshima Prefectural Commercial Exhibition Hall) in August 1915. 
It was renamed the Hiroshimakenritsu Shoohin Chinretsusho (Hiroshima Prefectural 
Products Exhibition Hall) in 1921. In 1933, its name was changed to Hiroshimaken 
Sangyoo Shooreikan (Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall) (see Hiroshima 
Peace Cultural Museum 1999). Regardless of its downfall from prosperity, Hiroshima 
has become acknowledged as a centre of world peace. Tragic images of the city and 
those that focus on its post-nuclear history eliminate the need for the government to 
justify the slogan ‘only A-bombed nation’. The pictures speak for themselves. 
The shift in the photo frame from general issues to specific events in the two 
national dailies took place surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. As 
the leader of the Socialist Party as well as prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi’s 
participation in the 1994 Hiroshima and Nagasaki peace ceremony was symbolic of 
this shift. The drastic change in national politics also encouraged the shift in a visual 
focus from general background to particular episode. The episodic photo captioned 
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‘At the Memorial Time of the Atomic Bombing, People at the Streetcar Station Facing 
the A-bomb Dome while Mediating’ appeared in the 6 August 1992 evening edition 
of the Asahi Shimbun. Since then, six out of eleven episodic photographs have the 
cenotaph in the background. One year later, the Yomiuri Shimbun placed a photo 
captioned ‘Children and Citizens Offering Flowers in Front of the A-bomb Cenotaph’ 
on its front page. Since 1993, ten out of eleven episodic photographs frame the 
cenotaph. Reflecting the fact that the local population living with the aftereffects of 
the atomic bomb has been declining with time, the newspapers have begun to focus 
on A-bomb-bereaved families and A-bombed survivors more than ever. Such on-the-
scene coverage characteristic of tabloid journalism encourages the imagination to 
figure out what really happened to individuals after the explosion. The episodic photo 
coverage also suggests that 6 August is not merely a national memorial day, but also 
the personal anniversary of each one of the A-bombed dead. In a sense, the episodic 
photo coverage of an individual A-bombed death calls for human rights. 
In a different way, the photo coverage of the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony 
consists of the thematic and the episodic frame.4 The thematic photo coverage 
emphasises peace by focusing on the Peace Memorial Statue, appealing for world 
peace, and praying for the repose of the souls of those killed by the atomic bomb. 
Eighteen thematic photographs on the front page of the Asahi and fifteen on the front 
page of the Yomiuri also frame the white pillar or pyramid with the words ‘Souls of 
the A-bombed Victims’ in front of the peace statue. With thematic framing, those 
photographs turn the ‘A-bombed victims’ into the same deities as those embodied in 
a Shintoist memorial zone. Hence the thematic photo coverage strengthens post-war 
Japanese cultural identity. 
In contrast, the episodic frame personifies the rebirth of the nation. Asahi Shimbun 
has carried twelve photographs of a few women who are wearing veils and praying 
at the memorial service held in the Urakami Catholic Church early in the morning of 
9 August. With an ideal of Japanese womanhood, those female figures evoke caring 
and innocent images like the Virgin Mary. The event-oriented coverage focusing on 
femininity and Catholicism implies the religious notions of ordeal and redemption. In 
addition, feminine representations suggest virtue, harmony and reconciliation. On the 
other hand, seventeen photographs on the Yomiuri front-page highlight the A-bomb–
bereaved families, A-bombed survivors, and A-bombed succeeding generations who 
are playing a major role in the peace ceremony. Here the episodic photo focuses 
4  In the photo coverage of the Nagasaki peace ceremony, the Asahi Shimbun has carried thirty-
two photographs on its front page since the first photograph, ‘Peace Ceremony in the Nagasaki Peace 
Park’, on 9 August 1957. Thirty-six photographs have appeared in the Yomiuri Shimbun since the 
first photograph, ‘People Paying a Visit to the Memorial for the A-bomb Victims, Doves Soaring’, in 
its 9 August 1965 evening edition.
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attention on the continuity and unity of the A-bombed community. In the allegory of 
the Holy Mother or the framework of family metaphor, the episodic photo coverage 
helps remove aggressive images of a fascist pre-war Japan and promote positive 
images of a democratic post-war Japan. To a certain extent, the national newspapers 
continue to associate ideals of peace with a reborn Japan. 
Analysing the editorial, news and photo coverage of the Asahi Shimbun and the 
Yomiuri Shimbun brings post-war Japanese collective identity into question. The print 
coverage of the A-bomb memorial days has helped the Tokyo government identify 
A-bomb memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the collective memory of post-
war Japan. In addition, the collective memory has been assumed to be natural in the 
national context. The first failure is an emphasis on war victimisation. The Tokyo 
government has imprinted the strong belief that, as the ‘only A-bombed nation’ 
in human history, Japan is different from other nations in the mind of the country. 
Here the government has incorporated the sites of A-bomb memories into the icons 
of the war catastrophes. The symbolic image of the A-bomb Dome has especially 
discouraged Japan from coming to terms with history and from looking critically at 
tension with China and South Korea. 
Second, both episodic and thematic photographs turn the sanctioned time and 
place of the A-bomb memorial days into a Shintoist memorial zone. On the analogy of 
the state ritual, the central government makes use of the photo coverage to recall the 
war losses and to identify the victims with something that will endure long after they 
are gone—their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the country. In other words, 
the Shintoist framework transforms the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
into Japan’s ordeal and redemption. Moreover, the contrast of visual rhetoric between 
before and after the atomic explosion reminds readers of the national effort to rebuild 
the war-torn country. In these regards, the government has taken advantage of the 
news network to foster another ‘ism’, nationalism that associates post-war Japanese 
economic growth with loyalty to the country. 
Through the national newspapers, the Tokyo government has used the A-bomb 
memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to diminish the agent who performed the act 
and should take responsibility. The government has underscored not human actions 
(e.g. those who dropped the atomic bomb), but the bomb—the product of human 
activities—to highlight the evil means. This emphasis on the agency that the agent 
used reflects the government’s belief that science and technology will improve the 
quality of life (Burke 1969a, 128, 275–86). In this pragmatic perspective, the role 
of the A-bombed cities has been to confirm the official claim of why Japan lost 
the war and has led to the pursuit of the promotion of scientific and technological 
advancement. 
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The key to the question of who is to preserve the memory of 6 and 9 August 
1945 would be we who are living in the ‘widespread and bewildering experience of 
trauma’ in the nuclear age (Caruth 1996, 11). As those who were eyewitnesses of the 
atomic destruction have gone, their photographs, wills and anecdotes become more 
important and are kept in archives. The electronic devices to present information as a 
‘living’ document enable us to replace public memorials and monuments with stocks 
of digital information. As ‘reality’ brings about various ‘individualistic values’ in 
the context of a certain situation, the direct access to such ‘living’ information does 
not guarantee getting the truth of history. For example, the Tokyo government has 
constructed the ‘reality’ of Japan as the ‘only A-bombed nation’ to disregard overseas 
victims of its wartime policy. 
Nevertheless, in a globalising society, archives might help us discover sharing 
grounds Burke calls ‘consubstantiality ([con = with] + [sub = under] + [stance = 
to stand])’ (Burke 1969b, 20–3). The more historical records become stocked in 
archives and readily accessible, the less room is left to the field of historical research 
to create fiction. Moreover, sharing material evidence will narrow the gap in the 
interpretation of history. This will also provide a great opportunity not for agreeing 
with, but for facing other historical interpretations. From these possibilities, the act of 
remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki will encourage us to develop an understanding 
of what the atomic bomb brings to the world. 
The contemporary moment
We tend to identify ourselves with what to ‘re-member’ at the contemporary moment 
of here and now. A particular past that is memorialised, visualised and symbolised 
from a certain point of view constructs a collective memory and strengthens social 
membership. Hence Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been useful for the Tokyo 
government to represent Japan as a principled pacifistic nation. Moreover, the 
Japanese news media have focused on the course of history, especially the advent of 
nuclear weapons, with the official ‘only A-bombed nation’ phrase. In the framework 
of a national media event, the government has used the peace ceremonies to convince 
the nation anew that Japan is indeed special, singled out for the atomic bomb that 
carried peace into the world (Dayan and Katz 1992). 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been symbolic of Japan’s defeat in World War 
II. The Tokyo government has called for this grief to join those who died for the 
country with those who were killed by the nuclear bomb, using the Japanese notion 
of gisei that implies both passive ‘victimisation’ and active ‘sacrifice’. For the 
Japanese, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the starting point of post-war Japanese peace 
and prosperity much as another vanquished country, Germany, had no choice but to 
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start from the Holocaust memory represented by Auschwitz. The nuclear attack, as 
nowhere else, has allowed post-war Japan to identify itself not as an aggressor, but 
as a victim. Generally speaking, Tokyo has encouraged those who live in Japan to 
‘re-member’ the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki every 6 and 9 August, 
thereby legitimatising post-war Japanese cultural identity (see Sakai 1995). In this 
way, the Tokyo government has fashioned the Japanese nation into an imagined 
community of the ‘only A-bombed nation’ that pledges not to ‘make the same mistake’ 
and to maintain ‘post-war Japan’s peace and prosperity’ every 15 August. 
Since the 1990s, however, the national news media have changed the focus of 
the A-bomb memorial days from public issues to personal episodes. Until fifty years 
had passed since the war’s end, the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun focused 
attention on the A-bomb Cenotaph and the Peace Memorial Statue in their front-page 
photo coverage. The thematic focus on the A-bomb issue helped the Tokyo government 
shape the collective memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki into an ‘unforgettable 
tragedy’ of Japan. After half a century, the photo coverage began using the episodic 
frame to highlight the personal memory of each individual A-bombed death. This 
shift may well suggest the difficulty post-war generations have in experiencing what 
their country went through, got over, and is still living with. 
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